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SUMMARY: This article compares theories and social policies of social democrats
and other representatives of the left-wing political spectrum in six European
countries to explain why, in certain countries such as Sweden, Norway, and
Switzerland, weak social groups became the target of illiberal and negative eugenic
policy, especially isolation and sterilization, while elsewhere left-wing politicians
and theorists were far less radical. One striking feature that emerges is the
difference between a communitarian-organic and a class-bound form of socialism.
Following Zygmunt Bauman, Michel Foucault, and James C. Scott, the article
discerns a first variant of citizenship that is conditional and intended only for those
with the right social attitude. Eugenics was perfectly consistent with such a view,
since it offered a diagnosis and at the same time a cure. Prominent representatives
of this approach were the Webbs in Britain and the Myrdals in Sweden. Such
an organic-medical approach was less likely, however, in a more class-dependent
variant of socialism embedded in a strong civil society. As long as social democrats
and other leftist politicians believed social problems such as inequality and poverty
were caused primarily by an unjust capitalist system, there was little cause for
a eugenicist solution.
* This article previously appeared in Dutch in a collection of essays edited by Jan van Bavel and
Jan Kok, ‘‘De levenskracht der bevolking’’. Sociale en demografische kwesties in de Lage Landen
tijdens het interbellum (Leuven, 2010). The translation is by Chris Gordon. I would like to
express my appreciation to Jan Kok, Thomas Lindblad, Marcel van der Linden, Jan Lucassen,
Anna Petterson, Peter Tammes, and Adriaan van Veldhuizen for their comments on previous
versions of this essay.
INTRODUCTION
In the mid-1970s Sweden’s parliament abolished the eugenics-inspired
sterilization legislation enacted in 1935 by a social democratic govern-
ment. During the four decades that passed between implementation and
abolition, almost 63,000 Swedes were rendered infertile, in many cases in
response to pressure from the state and sometimes as a result of outright
compulsion. Furthermore, it was chiefly those regarded as ‘‘unproductive’’
who were the targets of that social policy.1
Due especially to the collection of essays published as Eugenics and the
Welfare State, which appeared in 1996, we now know a great deal about
those eugenicist measures, which were implemented in other Scandina-
vian counties too.2 Those essays build on a slightly older historiography
that drew attention to illiberal life-wing policies towards the ‘‘underclass’’,
who were regarded as parasitical. That historiography reflected a debate
in the 1970s and 1980s among British historians on the role of left-wing
theorists such as the Fabians,3 and the importance of eugenics to their
theories of social reform. The Fabians (such as Sidney and Beatrice Webb)
were especially influenced by the idea that the lowest echelons of society,
sometimes termed the ‘‘residuum’’,4 had hereditary defects and would
increasingly degenerate. In that, they drew inspiration from the work of
1. Gunnar Broberg and Nils Roll–Hansen (eds), Eugenics and the Welfare State: Sterilization
Policy in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland (East Lansing, MI, 1996). See also Alberto
Spektorowski and Elisabet Mizrachi, ‘‘Eugenics and the Welfare State in Sweden: The Politics of
Social Margins and the Idea of a Productive Society’’, Journal of Contemporary History, 39
(2004), pp. 333–352.
2. A reprint with a new preface appeared in 2005. For Norway, see also Per Haave, ‘‘Ster-
ilization Under the Swastika: The Case of Norway’’, International Journal of Mental Health, 36
(2007), pp. 45–57.
3. The Fabian Society is a British intellectual movement founded in London in 1884 for the
purpose of advancing the principles of social democracy through gradualist rather than revo-
lutionary means. The name Fabian is a reference to the Roman general Quintus Fabius Max-
imus, nicknamed ‘‘Cunctator’’ (the delayer), because of his tactic of attrition and avoidance
(rather than seeking open confrontation) in the war against the Carthagian general Hannibal in
the third century before Christ.
4. Around the mid-nineteenth century social reformers used the term ‘‘residuum’’ to refer
especially to Londoners who failed to benefit from industrial progress and who were either
unemployed or seldom in work. Marx, who used the term ‘‘relative surplus population’’, dis-
tinguished between the reserve army of labour and the ‘‘unemployable’’, also termed the
lumpenproletariat. See Ann M. Woodall, What Price the Poor? William Booth, Karl Marx and
the London Residuum (Aldershot, 2005), p. 1. For the term lumpenproletariat see Robert L.
Bussard, ‘‘The ‘Dangerous Class’ of Marx and Engels: The Rise of the Idea of the ‘Lumpen-
proletariat’’’, History of European Ideas, 8 (1987), pp. 675–692. See also John Welshman,
Underclass: A History of the Excluded 1880–2000 (London, 2006), pp. 1–20, and Patricia van
den Eeckhout, ‘‘‘De onbewoonbare krotten zijn etterende middens, waar al de ziekten van het
sociaal korps gisten.’ De kruistocht tegen de krotwoningen in het interbellum’’, in Van Bavel
and Kok, ‘‘De levenskracht der bevolking’’.
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the famous statistician, geographer, and anthropologist Sir Francis Galton,
a half-cousin of Charles Darwin, thirteen years Galton’s senior. It was
Galton who coined the term ‘‘eugenics’’, in 1883, arguing that the elite
should be encouraged to have more children, while procreation among
the lower classes should be restricted.5
Thus, the leading Fabian Sidney Webb wrote in The Difficulties of
Individualism (1896) about the ‘‘breeding of degenerate hordes of a
demoralized ‘residuum’ unfit for social life’’.6 That underclass would have
many more children than those with superior hereditary material, such as
skilled labourers and the middle class. Failure to intervene eugenically,
either positively (by encouraging the better citizenry to have more chil-
dren) or negatively (making it more difficult for the inferior citizenry to
procreate), would lead societies to commit race suicide owing to the
‘‘rapid multiplication of the unfit’’, as it was put in the title of a book
by the US radical feminist Victoria Woodhull which appeared in 1891.7
The Webbs argued that it was the duty of the state to take the lead in
the matter.
Karl Pearson, a self-professed socialist,8 prominent statistician, and, by
1911, head of the Galton Biometric Laboratory and the first Galton
Professor of Eugenics,9 declared in that respect that
The legislation or measures of police, to be taken against the immoral and anti-
social minority, will form the political realization of socialism. Socialists have to
inculcate that spirit which would give offenders against the state short shrift and
5. Francis Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development (London, 1883). The
book is a collection of some 40 articles on human heredity which Galton wrote between 1869
and 1883.
6. Sidney Webb, The Difficulties of Individualism (London, 1896). The relationship between
the Fabians and eugenicists has been the subject of a recent study by So¨ren Niemann-Findeisen:
Weeding the Garden: Die Eugenik-Rezeption der fru¨hen Fabian Society (Munster, 2004).
Unfortunately, I have been unable to locate a copy in any Dutch library. On the internet, only
an extensive list of its contents is available.
7. Michael W. Perry, Lady Eugenist: The Rapid Multiplication of the Unfit. Feminist Eugenics in
the Speeches and Writings of Victoria Woodhull (Seattle, WA, 2005). On the fear of ‘‘race
suicide’’ see also Gareth Stedman Jones, Outcast London: A Study in the Relationship Between
Classes in Victorian Society (Oxford, 1971), and Thomas C. Leonard, ‘‘Retrospectives: Eugenics
and Economics in the Progressive Era’’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19 (2005),
pp. 207–224.
8. The extent to which he was a socialist is much disputed by scholars. Influenced by the
German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), Pearson advocated a strong state and
saw little virtue in full democracy. He believed in the fundamental equality of men and women,
but his social Darwinist convictions led him to oppose the welfare state, which, he argued,
artificially fostered the survival of the ‘‘unfit’’. See Daniel Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics:
Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity (Cambridge, MA, 1985), p. 35. After the 1890s he
continued to be strongly influenced by socialist and Marxist ideas; Theodore M. Porter, Karl
Pearson: The Scientific Life in a Statistical Age (Princeton, NJ [etc.], 2004), pp. 104–108.
9. Porter, Karl Pearson, p. 279.
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the nearest lamp-post. Every citizen must learn to say with Louis XIV, l’etat
c’est moi.10
Some, such as Pearson and Havelock Ellis, a well-known Fabian, took a
Social Darwinist approach and categorically rejected any form of support
for the ‘‘residuum’’, since such support would inevitably have a ‘‘dysgenic’’
effect. That view is nicely illustrated by Ellis:
The superficially sympathetic man flings a coin to the beggar; the more deeply
sympathetic man builds an almshouse for him so that he need no longer beg; but
perhaps the most radically sympathetic of all is the man who arranges that the
beggar shall not be born. So it is the question of breed, the production of fine
individuals, the elevation of the ideal of quality in human production over that of
mere quantity, begins to be seen, not merely as a noble idea in itself, but as the only
method by which Socialism can be enabled to continue on its present path.11
Inspired by Marx, Lasalle, Bebel, as well as Darwin, Pearson was no
less radical, advocating what he termed ‘‘national efficiency’’. Socialist
nations, he argued, must embrace eugenics, eliminate class antagonisms
and inequalities, and promote national unity. Only then could competi-
tion from other countries be resisted, ‘‘chiefly by way of war with inferior
races, and with equal races by the struggle for trade-routes and for the
sources of raw materials and of food supply. This is the natural history
view of mankind.’’12 So he supported the elimination of Aboriginals in
Australia and North America. Sidney Webb did not go so far as to deny
the ‘‘unfit’’ all assistance, but he too was unambiguous in his advocacy of
negative eugenics. In 1907 he wrote that the superior classes had far too
few children and the inferior classes too many. That ‘‘adverse selection’’
was leading to ‘‘race suicide’’, and the country would slowly but surely
fall victim to the Irish and the Jews.13 He proposed a system of state
grants for ‘‘good’’ families from the working class, and later argued in
favour of segregating the ‘‘feeble-minded’’.
Opinions differ about the significance of eugenics for the left. Many
scholars argue that similar biological theories were fairly widespread in
Europe and the Americas in the first half of the twentieth century and that
they held a great appeal for leftist social reformers.14 Others claim it was
10. Diane B. Paul, ‘‘Eugenics and the Left’’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 45 (1984),
pp. 567–590, 573.
11. Havelock Ellis, The Task of Social Hygiene (London, 1913), pp. 324–325.
12. P. Crook, Darwin’s Coat-Tails: Essays on Social Darwinism (New York, 2007), p. 156. See
also Porter, Karl Pearson, p. 151.
13. Gertrude Himmelfarb, Poverty and Compassion: The Moral Imagination of the Late
Victorians (New York, 1991), p. 368.
14. J.M. Winter, ‘‘The Webbs and the Non-White World: A Case of Socialist Racialism’’,
Journal of Contemporary History, 9 (1974), pp. 181–192; D. MacKenzie, ‘‘Eugenics in Britain’’,
Social Studies of Science, 6 (1976), pp. 499–532; Michael Freeden, ‘‘Eugenics and Progressive
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merely an opportunistic flirt, and that such theories did not form a
structural element of their philosophy.15 There were those too who
argued that the Fabians were not real socialists. The current communis
opinio is that most Fabians, the Webbs above all, had a major influence on
the development of social democracy and on the welfare state in Europe,
and that they were strongly influenced by Galton’s ideas.16
Since the 1990s, the debate about the relationship between the ‘‘left’’
and eugenics has become much broader in the wake of Zygmunt Bauman’s
influential studies of ‘‘modernity’’ and the Holocaust. Bauman describes
‘‘modernity’’ as a process in which to promote greater individual security
people are willing to forego a degree of freedom. The managing of risks and
uncertainties is left to bureaucracies, which in turn are expected to create
order in the chaos of society. Everything which the responsible authorities
believe threatens social stability is automatically regarded as a problem.17
Closely related to that theory are Foucault’s concepts of the ‘‘pastoral state’’,
which exercises its power to ensure the health and welfare of its citizens,18
and ‘‘biopower’’, with the state endeavouring to control the personal lives of
its citizens.19 Foucault argues that the state uses a variety of different
techniques for the purpose, from statistics and registration to recording
personal identities by fingerprinting and photographing individuals.
The emphasis on the role of the state and its use of technocratic methods
to discipline the population and so solve social problems is a central theme
too in James Scott’s Seeing Like a State, which appeared in 1998.20 Scott
Thought: A Study in Ideological Affinity’’, Historical Journal, 22 (1979), pp. 645–671, and idem,
‘‘Eugenics and Ideology’’, Historical Journal, 26 (1983), pp. 959–962; Paul, ‘‘Eugenics and the
Left’’; Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics; and Mark B. Adams (ed.), The Wellborn Science:
Eugenics in Germany, France, Brazil, and Russia (New York, 1990); Crook, Darwin’s Coat-
Tails, pp. 249–252.
15. G.R. Searle, Eugenics and Politics in Britain: 1900–1914 (Leiden, 1976), and idem, ‘‘Eugenics
and Class’’, in C. Webster (ed.), Biology, Medicine and Society 1840–1940 (Cambridge, 1981),
pp. 217–242; Greta Jones, ‘‘Eugenics and Social Policy between the Wars’’, Historical Journal, 25
(1982), pp. 717–728. See also D. Porter, ‘‘‘Enemies of the Race’: Biologism, Environmentalism,
and Public Health in Edwardian England’’, Victorian Studies, 34 (1991), pp. 159–178, 160.
16. Daniel Becquemont, ‘‘Euge´nisme et socialisme en Grande-Bretagne, 1890–1900’’, Mil neuf
cent, 18 (2000), pp. 53–79, 56.
17. Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge, 1989), and idem, Modernity
and Ambivalence (Ithaca, NY, 1991).
18. B. Golder, ‘‘Foucault and the Genealogy of Pastoral Power’’, Radical Philosophy Review, 10
(2007), pp. 157–176.
19. Ve´ronique Mottier, ‘‘Eugenics and the Swiss Gender Regime: Women’s Bodies and the
Struggle against ‘Differences’’’, Schweizerische Zeitschrift fu¨r Soziologie, 32 (2006), pp. 253–268;
Gisela Hauss and Be´atrice Ziegler, ‘‘City Welfare in the Sway of Eugenics: A Swiss Case Study’’,
British Journal of Social Work, 38 (2008), pp. 751–770.
20. James C. Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition
have Failed (New Haven, CT, 1998).
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considers several examples of projects conceived by the state to promote
human welfare which turned out to have calamitous effects for those
involved, including the forced collectivization of agriculture by the Soviets
and the construction of large-scale banlieues in France (inspired by Le
Corbusier). According to Scott, many top-down projects of that type prove
disastrous because the technocratic planners are seized by a spirit of ‘‘high
modernism’’ and fail to take account of local expertise or the needs of the
people whose lives the projects are intended to improve.
It is claimed that this ‘‘high modernism’’, which could also be taken to
include the social engineering discussed in the present article, was possible
above all under dictatorships and in societies with a weak civil society,
where, in its planning, the state encountered little if any resistance from
citizens or other intervening actors, such as the Church, trade unions, or
NGOs.21 Independently of Scott, Frank Diko¨tter came to a similar
conclusion in an article on the history of eugenics: ‘‘Open democracies
with a vibrant civil society, such as Britain and the Netherlands, were
generally less inclined to adopt extreme eugenic proposals than author-
itarian regimes in Germany and the People’s Republic of China.’’22
Both Bauman and Scott stress that states, particularly authoritarian
states, wishing to create a modern well-ordered society were receptive to
radical forms of social engineering. With the major role assigned to
intervention by state-paid experts, eugenics was easily assimilated into
such modernization projects.23 Today, there would seem to be a large
degree of consensus regarding the relationship between eugenics and the
progressive movement, certainly in the first half of the twentieth century,
as Paul Crook remarked in his recent book on Social Darwinism: ‘‘In fact
if you examine the rhetoric of eugenic science [y] you find that it
actually best fitted in with contemporary ‘progressivist’ language that
celebrated social engineering and meritocracy, professionalism and the
dominance of experts.’’24 According to Weiner, positive eugenics and its
21. Ibid., pp. 4–5.
22. Frank Diko¨tter, ‘‘Race Culture: Recent Perspectives on the History of Eugenics’’, American
Historical Review, 103 (1998), pp. 476–478, 476.
23. Ibid.; Desmond King, In the Name of Liberalism: Illiberal Social Policy in the USA and
Britain (Oxford, 1999); D. Porter, ‘‘Eugenics and the Sterilization Debate in Sweden and Britain
Before World War II’’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 24 (1999), pp. 145–162; Amir Weiner,
‘‘Introduction: Landscaping the Human Garden’’, in idem (ed.), Landscaping the Human
Garden: Twentieth-Century Population Management in a Comparative Framework (Stanford,
CA, 2003), pp. 1–18, 4; Leonard, ‘‘Retrospectives: Eugenics and Economics in the Progressive
Era’’; Natalia Gerodetti, ‘‘Eugenic Family Politics and Social Democrats: ‘Positive’ Eugenics
and Marriage Advice Bureaus’’, Journal of Historical Sociology, 19 (2006), pp. 217–244; and
Shelton Stromquist, Reinventing ‘‘The People’’: The Progressive Movement, the Class Problem,
and the Origins of Modern Liberalism (Urbana, IL [etc.], 2006).
24. Crook, Darwin’s Coat-Tails, p. 251.
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destructive twin brother ‘‘euthanasia’’ enjoyed virtually universal support
during the first half of the twentieth century.25 Given the significant
opposition to positive eugenics, especially in Catholic countries, that claim
is slightly exaggerated, but that many – spanning the entire political spec-
trum of left to right – were attracted by the ideas of eugenics is indisputable.
In the historiography of the past few decades, by far the majority of
studies of left-wing eugenics relate to Britain and the United States.
Generally, they lack any comparative perspective, and give relatively little
consideration to the role of social democracy. The same cannot be said of
a number of more recent comparative studies of Scandinavia, Germany,
and Switzerland,26 which show that eugenic ideas and programmes found
easy acceptance within the ideologies of social democratic welfare states,
with their emphasis on a strong state and the subordination of the indi-
vidual to the community. Although the targets of negative eugenics varied
(immigrants, ethnic minorities, or the indigenous underclass), the under-
lying societal vision shows great similarity.
We should also bear in mind that eugenics did not constitute a well-
defined science but was interpreted in widely different ways; and, moreover,
that many people involved in the eugenics debate did not necessarily regard
the ‘‘nature’’ approach as incompatible with ‘‘nurture’’ factors.27 As Diko¨tter
remarked, it was more in the way of being a ‘‘modern’’ approach to dis-
cussing social problems in biological terms. And so during the interwar
25. Weiner, ‘‘Introduction: Landscaping the Human Garden’’, p. 6.
26. Gunnar Broberg and Mattias Tyde´n, ‘‘Eugenics in Sweden: Efficient Care’’, in Broberg
and Roll-Hansen, Eugenics and the Welfare State, pp. 77–149; Gunnar Broberg and Nils
Roll-Hansen, ‘‘Preface to the 2005 Edition’’, in idem (eds), Eugenics and the Welfare State:
Sterilization Policy in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland (East Lansing, MI, 2005),
pp. ix–xvii; Diko¨tter, ‘‘Race Culture’’; Porter, ‘‘Eugenics and the Sterilization Debate’’; Peter
Weingart, ‘‘Science and Political Culture: Eugenics in Comparative Perspective’’, Scandinavian
Journal of History, 24 (1999), pp. 163–177; Wiebke Kolbe, Elternschaft im Wohlfahrtsstaat.
Schweden und die Bundesrepublik im Vergleich 1945–2000 (Frankfurt, 2002); John Rogers
and Marie C. Nelson, ‘‘‘Lapps, Finns, Gypsies, Jews, and Idiots’: Modernity and the Use of
Statistical Categories in Sweden’’, Annales de De´mographie Historique, 1 (2003), pp. 61–79;
Alberto Spektorowski, ‘‘The Eugenic Temptation in Socialism: Sweden, Germany, and the
Soviet Union’’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 46 (2004), pp. 84–106; Spektor-
owski and Mizrachi, ‘‘Eugenics and the Welfare State in Sweden’’; Ve´ronique Mottier, ‘‘Sociaal-
democratie en eugenetica’’, Socialisme en Democratie, 9 (2003), pp. 20–28, idem, ‘‘Eugenics
and the Swiss Gender Regime’’; idem, ‘‘Eugenics, Politics and the State: Social Democracy and
the Swiss ‘Gardening State’’’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical
Sciences, 39 (2008), pp. 263–269; V. Mottier and L. von Mandach (eds), Eugenik und Dis-
ziplinierung in der Schweiz: Integration und Ausschluss in Psychiatrie, Medizin und Fu¨rsorge
(Zurich, 2007); Thomas Etzemu¨ller, ‘‘Die Romantik des Reissbretts. Social engineering und
demokratische Volksgemeinschaft in Schweden: Das Beispiel Alva und Gunnar Myrdal
(1930–1960)’’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 32 (2006), pp. 445–466.
27. Becquemont, ‘‘Euge´nisme et socialisme en Grande-Bretagne’’, p. 61.
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period it became a feature of the political vocabulary of almost every
modernizing movement.28
The present article therefore goes beyond eugenics policy in a narrow
sense; it examines the broader relationship between biologistic ideas and
other ‘‘left-wing’’ measures to curtail the rights of individuals under the
pretext of protecting society from the ‘‘social locus of infection’’. Though
eugenics, with its emphasis on ‘‘nature’’, differs from ‘‘nurture-type’’
policy, such as re-educating the ‘‘unsocial’’, in both cases it was ‘‘illiberal’’
state policy that elevated the interests of what was presumed as the col-
lective above those of the individual.
Having read the historiography, one wonders why eugenics was not
embraced by social democrats in all western European countries after
World War I. Why did it make such substantial inroads in Scandinavia and
Switzerland, and to some extent in Germany, but not in Britain, the
Netherlands, nor France? Can such a dichotomy be explained by the
former having a weaker civil society and greater scope for ‘‘high mod-
ernism’’, as Scott, Bauman, and Diko¨tter hypothesize? Or was it a
reflection more of the nature of social democracy and its relationship to
other ‘‘players’’ within the national arena?
In the first case, one could expect all social democratic movements in
principle to have embraced some form of illiberal policy in order to
improve society. The second hypothesis claims that the form taken by
social democratic social policy depended largely on the particular view
regarding that welfare state which was to be created and the position of
power held by social democrats in relation to other political parties. To
answer those questions we shall consider first the Swedish and Swiss
cases, before analysing countries in which social democrats declined to
embrace eugenics.
THE EUGENIC TEMPTATION IN SWEDEN
In Sweden, as well as in other Scandinavian countries,29 the idea of
eugenics as a means to create a better society was influenced strongly by
the international debates taking place in Britain, the United States, and
Germany.30 In the wake of Galton, Fabians such as the Webbs, George
Bernard Shaw, and Havelock Ellis propagated the idea that the welfare
state must ensure that the ‘‘healthy and fit’’ should prevail above the ‘‘sick,
28. Diko¨tter, ‘‘Race Culture’’, p. 467.
29. For a useful survey see Broberg and Roll-Hansen, Eugenics and the Welfare State.
30. A good example is Die Rassenhygiene in den Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika by
Ge´za von Hoffman, which appeared in 1913 and which had a major influence on the Danish
social democrat Karl Kristian Steincke; Bent Sigurd Hansen, ‘‘Something Rotten in the State of
Denmark: Eugenics and the Ascent of the Welfare State’’, in Broberg and Roll-Hansen, Eugenics
and the Welfare State, pp. 9–76, 28.
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parasites and unfit’’. It was the duty of the state to lead that. Or, as Sidney
Webb put it, ‘‘No consistent eugenist can be a ‘laissez faire’ individualist
unless he throws up the game in despair. He must interfere, interfere,
interfere!’’31 Like the Fabians, who pioneered Britain’s welfare state,32
Sweden’s social democrats saw little merit in the class struggle. Instead,
they regarded the Swedish nation as an organic whole, in which there was
no place for spongers and parasites.
Unlike those in Britain, Sweden’s socialists were already emphasizing the
interests of all the people and not just those of the proletariat as early as the
late nineteenth century. In 1890, the Swedish socialist Axel Danielsson
articulated this communitarian and anti-Marxist socialism,33 which expressly
included farmers and the lower middle classes. The emphasis on all people
was later adopted by the social democrat Ernst Wigforss in his vision of
‘‘industrial democracy’’, a concept that revealed the direct influence of the
Fabians.34 Closely related to that was the desire of the social democrats to
define the boundaries of a Swedish ‘‘people’s home’’ (folkhem)35 on the basis
of productive rather than ethnic and cultural characteristics.36
In Sweden, thinking in terms of ‘‘people’’ rather than class was stimu-
lated further by the interest in the biological and anthropological char-
acteristics of the ‘‘Northern race’’. As early as 1882, the Swedish Society
for Anthropology and Geography had conducted a survey of the popu-
lation in the wake of large-scale emigration to the United States, and in
1909 the Swedish Society for Racial Hygiene was founded, followed in
1910 by the Mendel Society, the first Swedish genetics association. Even
before World War I, leading doctors including Herman Lundborg, a
prominent figure in studies of racial biology, saw eugenics as a means to
counter the problem of immigration, and there was a widely held opinion
that the racial unity of the Swedish people was threatened.
To understand the ‘‘Swedish model’’ properly, with its emphasis on
folkhem37 as a type of Gemeinschaft,38 we must realize that Sweden’s
31. Paul, ‘‘Eugenics and the Left’’, p. 570.
32. Spektorowski, ‘‘The Eugenic Temptation in Socialism’’, pp. 86–87.
33. A position adopted by Gunnar Myrdal too; B. Rothstein, ‘‘Managing the Welfare State:
Lessons from Gustav Mo¨ller’’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 8 (1985), pp. 151–170, 156.
34. Spektorowski, ‘‘The Eugenic Temptation in Socialism’’, p. 87; see also T. Tilton, ‘‘A Swedish
Road to Socialism: Ernst Wigforss and the Ideological Foundations of Swedish Social
Democracy’’, American Political Science Review, 73 (1979), pp. 505–520, 506.
35. A concept introduced in 1928 by the social democrat and later prime minister Per Albin
Hansson; Broberg and Roll-Hansen, Eugenics and the Welfare State, p. 5.
36. Spektorowski, ‘‘The Eugenic Temptation in Socialism’’, p. 92.
37. Folkhemmet is also the term for the welfare state as a whole. See also J. Andersson,
‘‘Choosing Futures: Alva Myrdal and the Construction of Swedish Futures Studies,
1967–1972’’, International Review of Social History, 51 (2006), pp. 277–295, 278.
38. Etzemu¨ller, ‘‘Die Romantik des Reissbretts’’.
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social democrats, who were in government as coalition partners from
1917 and who dominated it from 1932,39 believed society risked disin-
tegrating because of an all-pervasive anomie. In short, it was the classic
problem of ‘‘modernity’’ as formulated by the founders of sociology
(Durkheim, Comte, Simmel, and To¨nnies). In addition, Swedish socialists
pointed to the country’s lack of economic development and low rate of
population growth, which highlighted the need for an active and inter-
ventionist social policy.
From the 1920s onwards, the academics and public intellectuals Alva
and Gunnar Myrdal (the latter also a Member of Parliament for the Social
Democratic Party) played a leading role in shaping and legitimizing that
policy.40 Their role was comparable to that of the Webbs in Britain, except
that the Myrdals were supported by the social democrats, who had the
added advantage of being in government. In an extremely influential book
on the population crisis in Sweden (Kris i befolkningsfra˚gan) which
appeared in 1934, they argued that the decline in the rate of population
growth should be countered by an active pro-natalist population policy
and positive social measures, because otherwise the social integrity of the
Swedish people would be endangered.41
They regarded the Swedish folkhem as a third way between fascism and
liberal democracy, and proposed an unprecedented degree of government
intervention.42 The faith, both of the Webbs and the Myrdals, in scientific
method and analysis and their criticism of ideological prejudice was
remarkable. Gunnar Myrdal wanted as far as possible to avoid romanticizing
social policy and insisted again and again on the importance of purely
rational technical analyses, even if those implied radical solutions.43
That position can be seen too in their ideas on, for instance, immi-
gration. Although the Myrdals were not opposed to immigration from
neighbouring countries, they regarded immigrants from southern and
eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia as a threat to the Swedish people and to
Sweden’s cultural heritage,44 since that sort of immigration would reduce
the social standards of the working classes to unacceptable levels. Or, as
Gunnar Myrdal cautiously expressed it in 1938, ‘‘Immigration to an old
country with a well-organized labor market and a rather highly developed
39. Initially with the Farmers’ League.
40. Alva Reimer Myrdal was a social psychologist, Gunnar an economist.
41. Spektorowski, ‘‘The Eugenic Temptation in Socialism’’, p. 93; see Go¨ran Therborn,
Between Sex and Power: Family in the World, 1900–2000 (London, 2004), p. 254.
42. Allan Carlson, The Swedish Experiment in Family Politics: The Myrdals and the Interwar
Population Crisis (New Brunswick, NJ, 1990), p. xi; Etzemu¨ller, ‘‘Die Romantik des Reiss-
bretts’’.
43. B. Cherrier, ‘‘Gunnar Myrdal and the Scientific Way to Social Democracy, 1914–1968’’,
Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 31 (2009), pp. 33–55, 40.
44. Carlson, The Swedish Experiment in Family Politics, p. 84.
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structure of social welfare is something which probably does not occur
without international friction.’’45
It was argued that to prevent Sweden being infected by ‘‘foreign ele-
ments’’, the fertility of its indigenous population should be raised, chiefly
by making it more attractive for women to have children. Hence their
proposal for an extensive system of cre`ches and paid pregnancy and
maternity leave, as well as the right for women to continue in work after
marrying.46 At the same time, the state must prevent the ‘‘wrong’’ people
from procreating. Alva Reimer Myrdal, who was awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize in 1982, wrote about this in the reissue of an English-language
publication Nation and Family which originally appeared in 1941. ‘‘In our
day of highly accelerated social reforms the need for sterilization on social
grounds gained momentum. Generous social reforms may facilitate
home-making and more childbearing than before among the groups of
less desirable as well as more desirable parents.’’47
It was not the importance of the individual but of the ‘‘social body’’
which was paramount.48 The Myrdals hoped that the creation of a wide-
ranging system of state cre`ches, after-school childcare, and other social
amenities would, to some extent, help young children to escape the
influence of their parents, and ensure that they could be reared by pro-
fessionals to become worthy citizens.49 By ensuring that children were
monitored continually by doctors, teachers, and other professionals, any
abnormalities could quickly be detected and remedied. The children re-
educated in that way could in turn exercise a healthy influence on their
parents, a process which within a few generations would give Sweden
better, healthier, and more collectively oriented and harmonious citizens.
Unlike national socialists, the Myrdals assumed that participation would
be voluntary and would prompt an improvement in the population from
45. Gunnar Myrdal, ‘‘Population Problems and Policies’’, Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 197 (1938), pp. 200–215, 203.
46. See also Silke Neunsinger, Die Arbeit der Frauen, die Krise der Ma¨nner: Die Erwerb-
sta¨tigkeit verheirateter Frauen in Deutschland und Schweden 1919–1939 (Uppsala, 2001).
47. Alva Reimer Myrdal, Nation and Family: The Swedish Experiment in Democratic Family
and Population Policy (Cambridge, MA, 1968), p. 215. Alva Myrdal wrote this book, she
claimed, in order to disseminate to an English-language audience the idea of the family-friendly
welfare state which she had co-developed with her husband: Nation and Family ‘‘is written
anew for the public in English-speaking countries. It is, however, at the same time to be
considered as a substitute for an British version of the Kris i befolkningsfra˚gan’’; Alva Myrdal
and Gunnar Myrdal, Kris i befolkningsfra˚gan (Stockholm, 1934); Alva Reimer Myrdal, Nation
and Family: The Swedish Experiment in Democratic Family and Population Policy (New York
[etc.], 1941), p. vii. I am indebted to Jan Kok for drawing my attention to the original 1941
edition.
48. Etzemu¨ller, ‘‘Die Romantik des Reissbretts’’, p. 449.
49. Carlson, The Swedish Experiment in Family Politics.
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below, at least as far as ‘‘right living’’ was concerned.50 For the socially
inferior, coercion rather than voluntariness was envisaged.
Though the Myrdals saw more virtue in positive than in negative
eugenics, they were not ill-disposed to the sterilization of those deemed
‘‘unfit’’ and they advocated a fairly radical policy of sterilizing the men-
tally disabled.51 As technical developments and the demand for efficiency
proceeded in industrial society, the question of human quality became
urgent. They did not in the first instance regard the ‘‘social substratum’’ as
a separate social class, but as a layer of ‘‘defectives’’ recruited from all
social classes. And in the case of hereditary defects, society was entitled to
intervene, not so much to improve the race, but in the interests of general
welfare. In their 1934 book they argued that sterilization of the ‘‘defi-
cient’’ was the inescapable consequence of the great sociological process
of adjustment that society was experiencing.52
A year after the publication of Kris i befolkningsfra˚gan the first ster-
ilization law was enacted in Sweden. Sterilization was backed by all the
major parties, but it was the social democrat Alfred Petre´n (1867–1964),
Member of Parliament and Chief Inspector of the Mental Hospitals, who
played an especially active role in pushing the law through and imple-
menting it. He regarded sterilization as an alternative to lifelong con-
finement, which was the fate of the mentally ill and epileptics. He was
a strong supporter of social indicators and a vociferous opponent of
the principle of voluntarism. He argued that the law should also be
applied to ‘‘morally inferior individuals’’, including those unable to care
for their children.
In the more stringent legislation of 1941, the concept of ‘‘antisociality’’
was given more central importance: it would actually be more humane to
sterilize people who displayed characteristics either hereditary or non-
hereditary that made it impossible for them to raise their children prop-
erty.53 Some social democrats actually believed this new law did not go far
enough; they were reluctant to be constrained by a hereditary strait-jacket
and pushed for sterilization to be applied as well to people whose beha-
viour was ‘‘socially inherited’’.54
The 1941 law assumed that in general, health care and the welfare state
were intended only for those who led respectable lives. One group which
did not meet that criterion were the tattare (gypsies/travellers).55 In the
50. Etzemu¨ller, ‘‘Die Romantik des Reissbretts’’, p. 454.
51. Broberg and Tyde´n, ‘‘Eugenics in Sweden’’, p. 104.
52. Ibid., p. 105.
53. See also Maija Runcis, Steriliseringar i folkhemmet (Stockholm, 1998).
54. Spektorowski, ‘‘The Eugenic Temptation in Socialism’’, p. 97.
55. See, for example, in general Leo Lucassen et al., Gypsies and Other Itinerant Groups: A
Socio-Historical Approach (London [etc.], 1998). In Sweden, the terms tattare and gypsy were
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period 1920–1940 the belief that tattare formed a biological and social
threat began to gain wider currency. Of interest in that respect is the
anthropometric research conducted by Gunnar Dahlberg in 1944,56 which
revealed no difference between the tattare and the rest of the Swedish
population, leading the author to conclude that in this case racial eugenic
arguments were fallacious. However, that did not imply that the state
should leave the tattare alone. Dahlberg argued that his research showed
that social criteria were at least as important, and as a consequence
the 1941 legislation was deemed applicable to ‘‘antisocials’’ – often
without their prior consent – ‘‘if they were considered unable to exercise
their legal capacity’’.
With the exception of its democratic character, Swedish communitarian
and ‘‘productivist’’ socialism had much in common with fascist and
national socialist organic theories on the role of the welfare state. Just as
under the Nazis, the welfare state in Sweden had to be protected from
‘‘unproductive antisocials’’ and so it became a ‘‘eugenic welfare state of the
fittest’’.57 The difference with Germany was that in Sweden it was not
racial but social criteria that formed the basis for exclusion. That is not
to say that there was no criticism of such a radical form of ‘‘social engi-
neering’’. Criticism was voiced not only in conservative quarters, but also
by the far left, including the leftist splinter group of socialists led by Karl
Kilbom, who, in the mid-1930s, warned against curtailing the rights of the
individual and accused the Myrdals of fascism. It was, though, a voice
crying in the wilderness.58
Ultimately, in Sweden, between 1934 and 1975 around 63,000 people
were sterilized, 90 per cent of them women. Some of that involved
voluntary sterilizations, for health reasons or as a form of birth control.
However, perhaps one-quarter of those sterilizations were forced on
people, largely women, regarded as morally and socially inferior.59 Dur-
ing the course of the 1950s, the policy gradually became less paternalistic,
with the emphasis increasingly on free individual choice. Moreover, the
interests of society had given way to those of the individual.60
used interchangeably. The tattare were also taken to include sedentary gypsies, but the term was
used to refer to vagabonds too, and tramps; Rogers and Nelson, ‘‘‘Lapps, Finns, Gypsies, Jews,
and Idiots’’’, p. 69.
56. Dahlberg owed his appointment in part to Gunnar Myrdal, and he stayed in close touch
with the British left-wing geneticist Lancelot Hogben, whom we shall come across later; Porter,
‘‘Eugenics and the Sterilization Debate’’, p. 151.
57. Spektorowski, ‘‘The Eugenic Temptation in Socialism’’, p. 85.
58. Carlson, The Swedish Experiment in Family Politics, p. 164.
59. Runcis, Steriliseringar i folkhemmet. See too Broberg and Roll-Hansen, ‘‘Preface to the
2005 Edition’’, pp. ix–xvii.
60. Ibid., p. xii.
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EUGENICS IN THE SWISS ‘‘GARDENING STATE ’’
At first sight, the Swiss case differs significantly from the Swedish. Not only
is Switzerland a federation, with each canton having a large degree of
autonomy, but there was also no social-democratic dominated government,
at least not at the federal level. Nonetheless, there too the relationship
between the welfare state, social democracy, and social engineering was
unmistakeable.61
How advanced Switzerland was in the field is best illustrated by the
famous Zurich-based psychiatrist and socialist Auguste Forel (1848–1931).
Responding to the spirit of the age, this self-acknowledged eugenicist
expressed alarm about the looming degeneration of the Swiss population,
and so advocated sterilization legislation and the screening of marriage
partners to exclude the ‘‘inferior’’ and thus their issue. Information con-
cerning their hereditary background was therefore necessary. Forel argued
that the greatest threat was posed by criminals, prostitutes, and alcoholics,
the mentally ill, those suffering from tuberculosis, drug addicts, gypsies,
vagrants, Jews, the Chinese, and Negroes; in short every ‘‘unordentliche
Bu¨rger’’.62 Forel was director of the world-famous Burgho¨lzli Clinic in
Zurich and, in 1892, the first person to perform sterilizations.63
Switzerland was also the first country to enact eugenics-inspired legisla-
tion, in 1912, which made it impossible for the mentally ill to marry.64 After
World War I the welfare state came to form the institutional framework
within which the ‘‘inferior’’ were treated. Since they made for a heavy burden
on state finances, partners regarded as socially or morally inferior were
permitted to marry only if they agreed to be sterilized. It was on that basis
that, in 1928, the canton of Vaud (Waadt) enacted Europe’s first eugenics
sterilization law; it remained on the statute book until 1985.65
Forel, a leading eugenicist, worked closely with psychiatrists and other
eugenicists such as Eugen Bleuler and Ernst Ru¨din, the latter being also an
adviser in Sweden.66 Their ideas appealed to the Swiss penchant for ‘‘order’’,
which offered no place for deviant social groups such as gypsies and
Jews, the mentally ill, the disabled, unmarried mothers, and homosexuals.67
61. Gerodetti, ‘‘Eugenic Family Politics and Social Democrats’’.
62. A. Forel, La question sexuelle expose´e aux adultes cultive´s (Paris, 1906).
63. Jacques Gasser and Genevie`ve Heller, ‘‘Etude de cas: les de´buts de la ste´rilisation le´gale des
malades mentaux dans le canton de Vaud’’, Gesnerus, 54 (1997), pp. 242–250, 244; Mottier,
‘‘Sociaal-democratie en eugenetica’’.
64. Gerodetti, ‘‘Eugenic Family Politics and Social Democrats’’.
65. Between 1919 and 1944 around 3,000 sterilizations were performed under that law; Philippe
Ehrenstro¨m, ‘‘Ste´rilisation ope´ratoire et maladie mentale: Une e´tude de cas’’, Gesnerus, 48
(1991), pp. 503–516, 503.
66. Broberg and Tyde´n, ‘‘Eugenics in Sweden’’, p. 92.
67. Mottier, ‘‘Eugenics, Politics and the State’’, p. 265.
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There was also the cost factor. Poor relief was a local responsibility, and
we see Protestant and social-democratic governed cantons, such as Vaud,
Berne, and Zurich, being especially receptive to eugenic arguments
and eugenics-inspired measures.68 In Zurich in the 1930s, for instance,
thousands of sterilizations were carried out, almost all of them, as in
Sweden, on women from the lower social classes. Closely related to the
policy of sterilization was the removal from their parents of some 600
‘‘Jenische’’ children between 1926 and 1972.69 Those children were placed
with foster families or put in children’s homes; some ended up in psy-
chiatric hospitals or even prison.70 Their parents were left in ignorance
of their children’s whereabouts.
Implementation of that policy was entrusted to a private organiza-
tion set up in 1926, Hilfswerk fu¨r die Kinder der Landstrasse, part of the
Swiss Pro Juventute foundation established in 1912, which revitalized
the policy of assimilation of itinerant groups which had been in effect
since 1850, two years after formation of the federal state, and made them a
target of a policy of ‘‘normalization’’.71 The motive underlying the policy
was articulated eloquently by the founder and, until 1960, director of
Hilfswerk, Alfred Siegfried (1890–1972). Although, inspired by the
leading psychiatrists of the time such as Robert Ritter72 and Josef Jo¨rger,73
he believed that the ‘‘Jenischen’’ had a congenital psycho-pathological
‘‘Wandertrieb’’. As a Catholic he was opposed to sterilization; he pre-
ferred to isolate and re-educate ‘‘Jenischen’’ children, as is apparent from
the following remark made in 1943: ‘‘Wer die Vagantita¨t erfolgreich
beka¨mpfen will, muss versuchen, den Verband des fahrenden Volkes zu
sprengen, er muss, so hart das klingen mag, die Familiengemeinschaft
auseinander reißen. Einen anderen Weg gibt es nicht’’. [If one wants to
fight vagrancy successfully, one must try to destroy the cohesion of the
68. Genevie`ve Heller and Gilles Jeanmonod, ‘‘Euge´nisme et contexte socio-politique.
L’exemple de l’adoption d’une loi sur la ste´rilisation des handicape´s et maldes mentaux dans le
canton de Vaud en 1928’’, Schweizerische Zeitschrift fu¨r Geschichte, 50 (2000), pp. 20–44.
69. Thomas Meier, ‘‘Zigeunerpolitik und Zigeunerdiskurs in der Schweiz 1850–1970’’, in
Michael Zimmermann (ed.), Zwischen Erziehung und Vernichtung. Zigeunerpolitik und
Zigeunerforschung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart, 2007), pp. 226–239, 232 and n. 44.
70. Walter Leimgruber et al., Das Hilfswerk fu¨r die Kinder der Landstrasse. Historische Studie
aufgrund der Akten der Stiftung Pro Juventute im Schweizerischen Bundesarchiv (Berne, 1998).
In principle, the Jenischen were regarded as indigenous, unlike gypsies (later ‘‘Sinti and Roma’’),
who were regarded as foreigners; Meier, ‘‘Zigeunerpolitik und Zigeunerdiskurs in der Schweiz
1850–1970’’, pp. 228–229. See also Thomas Huonker and Regula Lufi, Roma, Sinti und Jenische.
Schweizerische Zigeunerpolitik zur Zeit des Nationalsozialismus (Zurich, 2001).
71. Meier, ‘‘Zigeunerpolitik und Zigeunerdiskurs in der Schweiz 1850–1970’’.
72. An extensive and in-depth portrait of his life and work can be found in Wim Willems, In
Search of the True Gypsy: From Enlightenment to Final Solution (London, 1997).
73. As late as 1964, Siegfried wrote a book in which he expressly acknowledged his indebt-
edness to Ritter and Jo¨rger.
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travelling people; although this may sound harsh, one must tear the family
community apart. There is no other way.]74
It was not until 1972 that the policy was officially terminated, and in the
1980s it led to a heated social debate in Switzerland, culminating in a public
apology and compensation.75 The affair illustrates that ‘‘nature’’ and ‘‘nurture’’
arguments were not mutually exclusive within the realms of social policy, and
that in some cases they even reinforced one another. Thus Jo¨rger employed
eugenicist arguments to some extent, saying ‘‘vagabondage is a form of idiocy
and crime’’,76 but he also believed that environmental factors influenced
behaviour. Hence, the children were initially placed with Swiss foster families.
If good parenting failed to help, one could always opt to prevent them from
marrying or to sterilize them77 – a practice that strongly resembles the policy
pursued in Norway in relation to itinerant groups (tatare).78
However, the sterilization policy pursued in several Swiss cantons
targeted not so much travelling families as those regarded as antisocial,
those who, as in Sweden, formed a danger to the corps social.79 The most
significant opposition to the policy came from Catholics and liberals,
while right-wing and social democratic parties were generally supportive.
Thus, in the interwar period, sterilization legislation was adopted by
socialist-governed cantons such as Basle, Berne, and Zurich.80 The com-
bination of social democracy, the welfare state, and arguments favouring
cuts in public expenditure proved especially irresistible for many social
democrats. According to Mottier, who has studied at great length the
relationship in Switzerland between social democracy and eugenics from
a ‘‘Bauman-Foucault perspective’’, one motive underlying the support
given by socialists was their ideological affinity with state intervention:
‘‘Far from constituting an ‘accident’ in the history of social democracy,
the eugenic social experiments fit in comfortably with core elements
of social democratic ideology, in particular the subordination of the
individual to the collective interest of the national community.’’81
74. Meier, ‘‘Zigeunerpolitik und Zigeunerdiskurs in der Schweiz 1850–1970’’, p. 231.
75. Der Schweizerischer Beobachter reported on this policy as early as 1972, after which it was
terminated; the public debate did not really get underway until the 1980s.
76. For a more extensive treatment of these ideas see Willems, In Search of the True Gypsy.
77. Mottier, ‘‘Eugenics, Politics and the State’’.
78. In Norway, children of tatare (in Swedish tattare) were removed from their parents by a
state-sanctioned philanthropic religious organization from as early as the beginning of the
twentieth century while, under Norway’s sterilization law, 128 tatare were sterilized between
1934 and 1978; Haave, ‘‘Sterilization under the Swastika’’, pp. 51–52.
79. Ehrenstro¨m, ‘‘Ste´rilisation ope´ratoire et maladie mentale’’, p. 505; Gilles Jeanmonod, ‘‘La
mutation du concept de de´ge´ne´rescence en Suisse romande 1870–1920’’, Gesnerus, 55 (1998),
pp. 70–86, 85.
80. Hauss and Ziegler, ‘‘City Welfare in the Sway of Eugenics’’.
81. Mottier, ‘‘Eugenics, Politics and the State’’, p. 268.
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Just as in Sweden, what we see here then is a clear case of ‘‘high mod-
ernism’’, or in Bauman’s words a ‘‘gardening state’’ in which all ‘‘weeds’’ had
to be eliminated from the national garden in order to ensure the creation of
an exclusive national identity. Although racial differences were emphasized
more in Switzerland than in Sweden, in Switzerland too the driving force
were communitarian social democrats, who were focused on normalizing
society and excluding those regarded as parasites and unproductive. Fur-
thermore, in Switzerland too, ‘‘positive’’ eugenics-inspired measures, such as
the institution in the 1920s of sex and marriage advice bureaus, were at least
as important in social democratic demographic policy.82 Socialists especially
advocated subsuming personal interests in those of the collective state, as
Natalia Gerodetti noted: ‘‘Removed from the realm of the private and cat-
apulted into the arena of public concern marital reproduction in particular
was a concern of local politicians, many of whom were social democrats.’’83
A BRIDGE TOO FAR : EUGENICS IN THE BRIT I SH ,
GERMAN, FRENCH, BELGIAN, AND DUTCH LABOUR
MOVEMENTS
Although there was no lack of interest in eugenics on the left of the
political spectrum in Britain, Germany, France, Belgium, and the Neth-
erlands, unlike in Scandinavia and the Swiss cantons referred to earlier, in
none of those countries did that interest lead to sterilization laws nor
other forms of negative eugenics. At first sight, that can be explained by a
lack of political power and by opposition from other parties: the social
democrats were either excluded from participation in government for a
long period or had to share power.84
Most Catholics were bitterly opposed to intervening in divine provi-
dence: with the exception of Britain, the other countries discussed here all
had substantial Catholic populations which, at least after 1930, firmly
resisted all forms of eugenic interference. In that same year, Pope Pius XI
promulgated the encyclical Casti Connubii, which stressed the sanctity of
marriage and prohibited all forms of artificial birth control. The encyclical
also explicitly spoke out against eugenic laws.85 Another factor was
82. Gerodetti, ‘‘Eugenic Family Politics and Social Democrats’’, pp. 227–228.
83. Ibid.
84. The Dutch Social Democratic Workers’ Party (SDAP) did not enter government until 1939.
In the UK (1924, 1929–1931), Germany (1918–1921, 1923, and 1930), and France (1924–1926,
1936–1938) the participation of socialists and social democrats in government was usually brief,
and often those governments were coalitions.
85. Ingrid Richter, Katholizismus und Eugenik in der Weimarer Republik und im Dritten
Reich. Zwischen Sittklichkeitsreform und Rassenhygiene (Paderborn, 2001). See too Wouter de
Raes, ‘‘Eugenetika in de Belgische medische wereld tijdens het interbellum’’, Belgisch Tijdschrift
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the reluctance of most liberal political parties to become involved in
eugenic policies.
There are many other indications that the character of civil society in
western Europe differed from that in Scandinavia. Unlike Sweden, Nor-
way, and Denmark, other European countries had a less homogenous
society, and their greater political, social, cultural, and religious differ-
ences led to a much more variegated civil society with a greater likelihood
of opposition to ideas which might have far-reaching consequences for the
personal domain of certain groups of citizens.
Despite what our initial hypothesis might lead us to assume, the lack of
a social-democratic illiberal social policy was not, however, only a
question of a lack of political power and the presence of a more resilient
civil society. At least as important was the second hypothesis, which
accounts for the different experiences in terms of the nature of social
democracy and the political and social arena in which it operated. The
socialism that was more Marxist-inspired, with the key role it allocated to
class antagonisms, seems to have been of crucial importance. Although in
most European countries socialists played some part in government, the
hatchet of class conflict had not yet been buried and, certainly at the
national level, the labour movement represented primarily, rhetorically at
least, the interests of the working class. In that context, eugenics, defi-
nitely when preached by the middle class, was quickly interpreted as an
attempt by the bourgeoisie to stigmatize part of the working class as
inferior. That can be seen certainly in Britain and France, but also to a
slightly lesser extent in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. It also
explains why neo-Lamarckism found much more support in those
countries than in Scandinavia and Switzerland.86
France (and Belgium) had a particularly strong neo-Lamarckian
movement, which, though it acknowledged the role of hereditary influ-
ences, also believed in the importance of environmental factors such as
poverty and poor housing. The central tenet of neo-Lamarckism was that
human characteristics could be hereditary in an unfavourable environ-
ment. Moreover, as argued by Van den Eeckhout,87 French and Belgian
voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis, 20 (1989), pp. 399–464, 416, for the response of Belgian Catholic
doctors.
86. Stuart M. Persell, Neo-Lamarckism and the Evolution Controversy in France, 1870–1920
(Lewiston, NY, 1999). Jean-Baptiste Pierre Antoine de Monet, Chevalier de Lamarck
(1744–1829) was a French zoologist and botanist. Today he is known principally as the author
of the pre-Darwinist evolutionary theory of the inheritance of acquired traits. Following
Darwin’s publication of the theory of evolution, Lamarck (who had long since died) was
rediscovered by neo-Lamarckian scientists, who placed more emphasis on individual will,
creativity, and environmental factors.
87. Van den Eeckhout, ‘‘‘De onbewoonbare krotten’’’.
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Lamarckian eugenicists were less obsessed by the lower social classes since
they did not regard them as irreversibly and biologically inferior. They were
more concerned about the three fle´aux sociaux (alcoholism, syphilis, and
tuberculosis) and, reflecting their obsession with underpopulation, they were
more likely to emphasize positive eugenics instead.88
An interesting feature and a characteristic of the influence of Lamarckism
in Belgium was the work of the famous social scientist and socialist Emile
Vandervelde, who, in 1893, co-authored with the genetics and botany pro-
fessor Jean Massart a short book, Parasitisme organique et parasitisme social,
in which they compared the biological and social parasite, which both lived
at the expense of the other without giving anything in return. Unlike social
Darwinists, such as Karl Pearson in Britain, they regarded social parasitism
not as hereditary, but as a form of imitation.89
We can illustrate the fact that the factors reviewed above were given
different weights throughout western Europe by means of the following
table.
The effect of those factors within the various national contexts and how
they influenced the attitudes to eugenics and social engineering of socialist
and communist parties will be discussed in what follows.
Britain
As explained in the introduction, Britain was an important breeding ground
for leftist eugenicist and illiberal interventionist theories. However, that did
not mean those ideas were automatically translated into eugenicist measures.
Furthermore, many progressive and left-wing theorists were circumspect
about forms of negative eugenics, such as sterilization.
Table 1. Factors hindering the success of leftist negative eugenics in Europe
Catholicism
Class
antagonisms
Neo-
Lamarckism
Variegated and
strong civil society
Britain 1/2 X – X
France X X X 1/2
Belgium X X X X
Germany 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
Netherlands X 1/2 X X
Legend: X a major role; 1/2 a more modest role; – no role, or only a limited role.
88. Raes, ‘‘Eugenetika in de Belgische medische wereld tijdens het interbellum’’, p. 411. For
France see also Fabrice Cahen, ‘‘Medicine, Statistics, and the Encounter of Abortion and
‘Depopulation’ in France (1870–1920)’’, History of the Family, 14 (2009), pp. 19–35, who shows
that resistance to abortion was closely linked to fears of population decline.
89. Raes, ‘‘Eugenetika in de Belgische medische wereld tijdens het interbellum’’, pp. 441–442.
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That circumspection was illustrated well by the publication, in 1911, of
The Prevention of Destitution by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, in which
they discussed in rather guarded terms the significance of heredity and
emphasized the role of an effective welfare state.90 Their book examined
the problem of the British underclass, which the Webbs estimated com-
prised around 4 million people. The underclass was completely demor-
alized, and lived miserable lives in overcrowded British cities where,
because of their antisocial behaviour, they constituted a threat to society.
The Webbs referred in this connection to ‘‘moral malaria’’, ‘‘bestiality’’,
and ‘‘apathy’’.91 Fortunately, they continued optimistically, science was
now so advanced that something could be done about it. Moreover, it was
absolutely necessary to do it, because otherwise Britain would fall behind
other nations industrially and militarily.92
The Webbs sought the cause both in hereditary and social factors, for
many had succumbed to their desperate situation owing to external cir-
cumstances (poverty, ill-health, old age) and through no fault of their
own. To solve the problem of destitution, a range of measures was deemed
necessary, of which ‘‘eliminating bad parentage’’ was one.93 The Webbs
were categorically opposed, though, to the Social Darwinist option pro-
pagated by Karl Pearson and others, because there was no evidence that it
would lead to the ‘‘best’’ being selected. Nor did they have much faith in
a unilateral eugenicist approach.94 They recognized that poor social
conditions might lead to hereditary inferior offspring, for example
through alcoholism,95 but they continued to insist that the solution lay
primarily in improving social conditions. Even ‘‘perfect stock’’ could
degenerate in a bad environment.96
Although not a dominant group, there were also those on the left
sympathetic to the more hard-core eugenicist position, and, remarkably,
they were not necessarily ostracized nor even marginalized within the
leftist movement. One well-known example is the geneticist J.B.S. Hal-
dane, a member of the Communist Party who was appointed professor at
University College London in 1933 and four years later accepted a chair
there in biometry. Haldane acknowledged the role of environmental
factors, but he claimed that even the best environment could not improve
90. Lynn Hollen Lees, The Solidarities of Strangers: The English Poor Laws and the People,
1700–1948 (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 318–319.
91. Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, The Prevention of Destitution (London, 1911), p. 2.
92. For this social-imperialist view see Stedman Jones, Outcast London, p. 327, and Himmelfarb,
Poverty and Compassion, pp. 365–369.
93. Webb and Webb, Prevention of Destitution, p. 9.
94. Ibid., pp. 47–48.
95. Current research has demonstrated a clear relationship between alcoholic mothers and
brain damage in children born of alcoholic mothers.
96. Webb and Webb, Prevention of Destitution, pp. 50–51.
284 Leo Lucassen
a ‘‘born idiot’’. He was chairman of the editorial board of the Daily
Worker, the newspaper of the British Communist Party, in which capacity
he declared, in 1949, that the dogma of human equality was no part of
communism and that socially responsible eugenics was therefore fully
justified. It was a view he continued to espouse until his death in 1964.97
The socialist and leading American academic Hermann Joseph Muller
was another famous left-wing eugenicist. His controversial and popular
book Out of the Night: A Biologist’s View of the Future (1935), dis-
tributed in the UK by the Left Book Club, was in effect a manifesto for
eugenicist intervention.
It is easy to show that in the course of a paltry century or two (paltry, con-
sidering the advance in question) it would be possible for the majority of the
population to become of the innate quality of such men as Lenin, Newton,
Leonardo, Pasteur, Beethoven, Omar Khayyam, Pushkin, Sun Yat-sen, Marx
(I purposely mention men of different fields and races), or even to possess their
varied faculties combined.98
Muller, who went on to win the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1946,
worked as a zoologist at the University of Texas until 1932, and spent the
next eight years in Europe and Russia. In Out of the Night he argued that,
naturally, the environment mattered, but even the best circumstances
cannot transform an inherently stupid or selfish person into one who is
intelligent or altruistic.99 He also criticized the use of purely economic
criteria to determine whether an individual was genetically useful. Given
the marked inequality in capitalist societies, it was impossible to separate
genetic from environmental factors. A socialist revolution was therefore a
prerequisite for ensuring equal opportunities for all. The state would then
have to legalize birth control, as well as provide adequate childcare
facilities so that mothers could work outside the home (in that, his
position was similar to the one espoused by the Myrdals in their 1934
book). That would make it possible to prevent families having far too
many children and those children then growing up in poverty.100
If everyone were equal and able to decide for themselves how many
children they wanted to have, then the technical eugenic options were
unlimited, and included, he argued, the transplantation of fertilized female
egg-cells of high quality among women whose hereditary qualities were
greatly inferior. Conversely, using artificial insemination, the best men
97. Paul, ‘‘Eugenics and the Left’’.
98. Muller, cited in Elof Axel Carlson, The Unfit: A History of a Bad Idea (Cold Spring
Harbor, NY, 2001), p. 350.
99. Diane B. Paul, The Politics of Heredity: Essays on Eugenics, Biomedicine, and the Nature–
Nurture Debate (Albany, NY, 1998), pp. 17–18.
100. Carlson, The Unfit, pp. 347–348.
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could reproduce.101 In the 1930s Lancelot Hogben, who held a chair in
social biology at the Fabian-inspired London School of Economics,
developed a left-wing version of eugenics.102 However, alongside the role
of environmental factors he also stressed, like the Webbs in their 1911
book on destitution, the inherent class prejudices of many eugenicists.103
Socialist and communist scientists such as Haldane, Hogben, and Muller
were allowed to defend their views fervently, but ultimately they failed to
mobilize many allies in Britain. The ideal state had not yet dawned, and,
unlike most Fabians, until it did they continued to regard negative eugenics
as a socially biased project of the bourgeoisie whose sole target was the
working class.104 Like the broader labour movement, they thought pri-
marily in terms of class antagonisms, and in Britain at least that was a key
obstacle to the development of the communitarian and collectivist vision of
society which we saw in Sweden.105 It was an obstacle reinforced by the
strong liberal character of the British welfare state which, despite the
expansion of pension and insurance arrangements in the 1930s, continued to
be relatively rudimentary and leaned heavily on individual initiatives, with
charitable giving playing an important role.106
It is hardly surprising then that the campaign undertaken in the 1920s by
the Eugenics Society for legislation permitting voluntary sterilization came to
nothing. The parliamentary bill failed, due not only to controversies between
academics, but also, and especially, to strong opposition within the Labour
Party; among liberals, aversion to such legislation was almost as great.107
Germany
Opinion on the role of eugenicists in the Social Democratic Party of
Germany (SPD) is divided. According to Weindling, hereditary theories
101. Paul, The Politics of Heredity, p. 19.
102. Hogben in 1931: ‘‘Negative eugenics is simply the adoption of a national minimum of
parenthood, an extension of the principle of national minima familiarized in the writings of
Sidney and Beatrice Webb. It is thus essentially en rapport with the social theory of the col-
lectivist movement’’; Paul, ‘‘Eugenics and the Left’’, p. 574. See also Elazar Barkan, The Retreat
of Scientific Racism: Changing Concepts of Race in Britain and the United States Between the
World Wars (New York, 1992), pp. 232–233.
103. Diko¨tter, ‘‘Race Culture’’, p. 476.
104. John Macnicol, ‘‘Eugenics and the Campaign for Voluntary Sterilization in Britain
Between the Wars’’, Social History of Medicine, 2 (1989), pp. 147–169, and idem, ‘‘The
Voluntary Sterilization Campaign in Britain, 1918–39’’, Journal of the History of Sexuality, 2
(1992), pp. 422–438. See also Randall Hansen and Desmond S. King, ‘‘Eugenic Ideas, Political
Interests, and Policy Variance: Immigration and Sterilization Policy in Britain and the US’’,
World Politics, 53 (2001), pp. 237–263.
105. As argued too by Porter, ‘‘Eugenics and the Sterilization Debate’’, p. 158.
106. Lees, The Solidarities of Strangers, p. 343.
107. Macnicol, ‘‘Eugenics and the Campaign for Voluntary Sterilization’’.
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were a marginal phenomenon within the SPD.108 More recently, however,
historians have pointed out that well before Hitler’s rise to power in 1933
German social democrats (including Kautsky, Noske, Valentin Mu¨ller,
and Grotjahn) and sympathizers (such as the famous sexologist Magnus
Hirschfeld) were in fact susceptible to ideas about social engineering and
eugenics.109 Moreover, especially in the 1920s, many articles were pub-
lished in SPD circles reporting enthusiastically on the new eugenic pos-
sibilities and how they might benefit left-wing social policy. As in
Switzerland, they included marriage advice, voluntary sterilization, and
abortion. The argument that the lumpenproletariat was responsible for
pushing up public expenditure also played a major role.
On the left of Germany’s political spectrum, eugenic theories were
linked inseparably to the social question right from the late nineteenth
century. Many, including the influential progressive doctor Wilhelm
Schallmayer,110 feared their country would degenerate, a fear expressed by
the Fabians in Britain too, and so advocated a technological-eugenic
solution.111 By minimizing the size of the proletariat, the money that
would otherwise have been spent on incarcerating them in prisons and
other institutions could be used to emancipate decent and productive
workers.112 However, those forces were too weak to ensure broad support
for socialist eugenics. Nonetheless, as in Switzerland, that support was
much greater than in Britain.
A good example was the role of the SPD in Prussia, which, around
1930, forged plans together with the Catholic Centre Party (Zentrum) to
draft a sterilization law. Despite opposition among Catholics to eugenicist
intervention (both positive and negative), participation in government
encouraged many Zentrum politicians to consider carefully the problem
108. Paul Weindling, Health, Race and German Politics Between National Unification and
Nazism, 1870–1945 (New York, 1989).
109. Mottier, ‘‘Sociaal-democratie en eugenetica’’; A. Seeck, ‘‘Aufkla¨rung oder Ru¨ckfall? Das
Projekt der Etablierung einer ‘Sexualwissenschaft’ und deren Konzeption als Teil der Biologie’’,
in idem (ed.), Durch Wissenschaft zur Gerechtigkeit? Textsammlung zur kritischen Rezeption
des Schaffens von Magnus Hirschfeld (Munster, 2003), pp. 173–206, 180; Ju¨rgen Reyer, Eugenik
und Pa¨dagogik. Erziehungswissenschaft in einer eugenisierten Gesellschaft (Weinheim [etc.],
2003), p. 90.
110. Reyer, Eugenik und Pa¨dagogik, p. 56; Sheila Faith Weiss, Race Hygiene and National
Efficiency: The Eugenics of Wilhelm Schallmayer (Berkeley, CA, 1987). Schallmayer, who also
corresponded with Forel, was a typical representative of the Bildungsbu¨rgertum. He never
actually joined the SPD, but he did feel allied to the party, as well as to the genetic meritocratic
ideals of Pearson; Weiss, Race Hygiene and National Efficiency, pp. 86 and 174.
111. Sheila Faith Weiss, ‘‘The Race Hygiene Movement in Germany, 1904–1945’’, in Adams,
The Wellborn Science, pp. 8–68.
112. Michael Schwartz, Sozialistische Eugenik: Eugenische Sozialtechnologien in Debatten und
Politik der deutschen Sozialdemokratie, 1890–1933 (Bonn, 1995). See also Mottier, ‘‘Sociaal-
democratie en eugenetica’’.
Social Engineering and Eugenics in Twentieth-Century Europe 287
of the ‘‘inferior’’.113 A recent study has shown that among German
Catholics eugenicist thinking was much more widespread than assumed
until recently, especially among socially left-leaning Catholics, who in
Prussia worked closely with the SPD.114 Inspired by technocratic theories
of modernity and the necessity to rationalize society, after a brief incu-
bation period during the 1920s, those Catholics embraced part of eugenic
philosophy, including its negative variant – sterilization. Particularly the
younger generation of Catholic politicians welcomed the new project of
the welfare state enthusiastically, and they proved particularly willing to
support the negative eugenicist proposals of the Prussian SPD.115
Slowly but surely, Prussia’s Zentrum Party, which remained opposed to
voluntary abortion, proved amenable to a policy of sterilization, certainly
when the costs of the welfare state began to rise alarmingly with the onset
of the global economic crisis. It was only with the rise to power of the
National Socialists in 1933 that the Catholic and socialist parties recoiled.
Ironically, however, that Prussian draft sterilization law, which was ulti-
mately submitted by the Zentrum Party on its own in 1932, formed the
basis of the far more radical sterilization legislation of the Nazis.116
France
France, which like other European countries was seized by fears of
degeneracy, had had a strong neo-Lamarckian tradition since the nineteenth
century, and the emphasis in that tradition lay on environmental factors and
positive eugenics. Interest in positive eugenics was closely linked to con-
cerns about the low birth rate and led to the creation of a pro-natalist
movement, supported by the Church and the conservatives,117 which in turn
accounts for the wide range of measures to protect mothers and children
(sometimes termed natalism or puericulture). In addition, there was some
acceptance of large-scale immigration from countries such as Italy, Belgium,
and Poland.118
The global depression of the 1930s increased the currency of negative
measures such as limits to immigration, restrictions on marriage, and
113. Richter, Katholizismus und Eugenik, p. 349.
114. Ibid., p. 524. See also Thomas Knapp, ‘‘The Catholic Labor Movement in Germany
1850–1933: A Survey and a Commentary’’, Newsletter, European Labor and Working Class
History, 6 (1974), pp. 14–19.
115. Richter, Katholizismus und Eugenik, p. 88.
116. Ibid., p. 311.
117. William H. Schneider, ‘‘The Eugenics Movement in France, 1890–1940’’, in Adams, The
Wellborn Science, pp. 69–109, 71 and 103.
118. Leo Lucassen, The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in
Western Europe since 1850 (Urbana, IL [etc.], 2005), p. 92; Clifford Rosenberg, Policing Paris:
The Origins of Modern Immigration Control Between the Wars (Ithaca, NY, [etc.], 2006).
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sterilization, as well as triggering a debate on the quality of the con-
siderable immigration of unassimilable races.119 However, the conviction
that in essence ‘‘biology’’ was determined by poverty rather than the other
way round remained entrenched. With the social situation rapidly dete-
riorating (increasing unemployment and poverty), the French were more
easily persuaded to accept eugenic ideas.120
In principle, French socialists and communists were not unsympathetic
to eugenics, but they preferred the positive variant. In 1935 the com-
munists adopted virtually the entire programme of the French Eugenics
Society, because they wanted to prevent the working class degenerating
through alcoholism and syphilis. Hence the Communist Party incorpo-
rated abortion and ‘‘pre-natal screening’’ into its programme, a policy aim
which – ironically enough – would be implemented a few years later
under the authoritarian right-wing Vichy regime.121 As a result, the
communists placed themselves firmly in the communitarian tradition in
which the welfare of the entire people was paramount.
In 1935, the chief editor of the Communist Party newspaper
L’Humanite´, Paul Vaillant-Couturier, became a great advocate of com-
bating alcoholism, slums, prostitution, and social diseases, arguing that
otherwise the French people would go under. One solution was birth
control, with motherhood being regarded largely as a social function.122
Negative eugenics remained in the background, but it did not mean the
individual was not required to yield to some extent to society as a whole,
a point aptly summarized by William Schneider: ‘‘The left certainly had
no qualms about government intervention in the private sphere; more
important, the family policy could take advantage of the broad appeal of
natalist, social hygiene, and eugenic ideas that had been developing in the
first three decades of the twentieth century.’’123
The aversion to biological determinism in France explains why the
most famous French socialist eugenicist, Georges Vacher de Lapouge
(1854–1936), had so little success in his own country. Like Pearson in
Britain, Vacher de Lapouge, to whom the origins of ‘‘anthroposociology’’
can be traced,124 was a radical disciple of Galton. He believed in her-
editary factors only, and also in the existence of races, such as the Aryan,
119. As argued by Georges Mauco, Les e´trangers en France. Leur roˆle dans l’activite´ e´cono-
mique (Paris, 1932), p. 523. See also William H. Schneider, Quality and Quantity: The Quest for
Biological Regeneration in Twentieth-Century France (Cambridge, 1990).
120. Schneider, Quality and Quantity, pp. 75–85.
121. Idem, ‘‘The Eugenics Movement in France’’, p. 102.
122. Ibid., p. 99.
123. Ibid., p. 102.
124. Jennifer Michael Hecht, ‘‘Vacher de Lapouge and the Rise of Nazi Science’’, Journal of the
History of Ideas, 61 (2000), pp. 285–304, 287.
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which far transcended the nation-state. He was convinced that people
were fundamentally unequal, and only by rigorously selecting the very
best, preferably by artificial insemination, could mankind face the future
with confidence and optimism. With ideas of that sort, he became popular
in Britain, the United States, and Germany, but not in France itself, where
the traditions of the French Revolution and Lamarck dominated. From
1902, criticism of his biological determinism swelled to such an extent
that his work found an audience almost only abroad.125
The Netherlands
In the Netherlands too, the social question was prominent on the political
and social agenda in the second half of the nineteenth century. Around
the mid-nineteenth century the Leiden university librarian and classicist
Jacobus Geel characterized his less fortunate fellow Leiden citizens as:
‘‘the cursed common cattle married before their eighteenth, eat potatoes,
have consumptive children, depend on the poor box and beg’’.126 Whereas
in Britain and France especially, distrust on the part of the labour
movement based on class antagonism acted as an obstacle to the acceptance
of eugenics, in the Netherlands Catholicism played an important role,127
as did the country’s highly diverse civil society and neo-Lamarckian
tradition.
Although in subsequent decades many commentators continued to be
concerned about the social question, the rapid pace of urbanization,
alcoholism, and degeneration, whether or not due to ‘‘poisonous germ
plasm’’,128 the Lamarckian emphasis on environmental factors remained
dominant in the Dutch debate, even among socialists.129 That emphasis
was reflected in the more nurture-oriented ‘‘hygienist’’ movement, which
aimed to address social problems through preventive measures such as
better housing, improved water supplies, the construction of sewers, and
by combating diseases such as tuberculosis.
125. Pierre-Andre´ Taguieff, ‘‘Se´lectionnisme et socialisme dans une perspective aryaniste:
The´ories, visions et pre´visions de Georges Vacher de Lapouge (1854–1936)’’, Mil neuf cent, 18
(2000), pp. 7–51, 23 and 31.
126. Jan Noordman, Om de kwaliteit van het nageslacht. Eugenetica in Nederland 1900–1950
(Nijmegen, 1989), p. 37.
127. Idem, ‘‘Eugenetica en gezinsgrootte, katholieke opvattingen over de bevolkingskwaliteit
gedurende het interbellum’’, Pedagogische verhandelingen, 8 (1985), pp. 318–326.
128. Genetic material transmitted by procreation. It was believed that if, for example, during
conception one of the partners was inebriated, that might result in ‘‘the germ plasm being
poisoned’’. According to the German zoologist August Weismann (1834–1914), this inferior
genetic material would inevitably multiply by division; Reyer, Eugenik und Pa¨dagogik, p. 63.
See also A.F. Petterson, ‘‘Kiemvergif en drankbestrijding. De eugenetica van social-democraat
G.P. Frets (1879–1957)’’, paper for the M.Phil. in history, Leiden University, November 2009.
129. Noordman, Om de kwaliteit van het nageslacht, p. 32.
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At the end of the nineteenth century, eugenic determinism was certainly
fashionable, as can be seen from the naturalistic novels of Louis Couperus, in
which fatalism is a recurrent theme. Nonetheless, many regarded eugenic
determinism as excessively materialistic and reductionist. That does not
detract from the fact that many observers interpreted social problems in
biological terms also, as is evident from the debate on neurasthenia, which
was explained as being an exhaustion of the central nervous system attri-
butable to the intense pace of modern civilization. Many doctors believed
that this ‘‘disease of modern civilization’’ was partly hereditary.130 And
so there were enough eugenicists, such as Marie Anne van Herwerden
(1874–1934), Reader in Biology at the University of Utrecht, who believed
that the social developments taking place were leading to a significant
increase in the number of socially inferior individuals, who in turn promoted
antisociality.131 Ideas like that could be found repeated in a wide range of
journals, including the influential sociological journal Mensch en Maatschappij,
and such thinking was far from marginal among doctors and psychiatrists.132
Furthermore, that those ideas were more than theoretical can be seen by
the castration of some 400 homosexuals between 1938 and 1969, though
the term eugenics was carefully avoided.133
Nonetheless, why it was that so few Dutch social democrats134 felt
drawn to eugenics can probably be explained by the following factors.
To begin with, unlike in Britain or France there was no imperialistic social
130. Leonie de Goei, De psychohygie¨nisten: psychiatrie, cultuurkritiek en de beweging voor
geestelijke volksgezondheid in Nederland, 1924–1970 (Nijmegen, 2001). See also L. Nys et al.
(eds), De zieke natie. Over de medicalisering van de samenleving 1860–1914 (Groningen, 2002).
131. De Goei, De psychohygie¨nisten, p. 27.
132. As argued by Noordman, Om de kwaliteit van het nageslacht; De Goei (De psychohy-
gie¨nisten, p. 48) qualifies that view. See also H. Biervliet et al., ‘‘Biologisme, racisme en euge-
netiek in de antropologie en de sociologie van de jaren dertig’’, in F. Bovenkerk et al. (eds),
Toen en thans. De sociale wetenschappen in de jaren dertig en nu (Baarn, 1978), pp. 208–235,
S. Snelders and T. Pieters, ‘‘Van degeneratie tot individuele gezondheidsopties. Het maat-
schappelijk gebruik van erfelijkheidsconcepten in de twintigste eeuw’’, Gewina, 26 (2003),
pp. 203–215, and idem, ‘‘Alcoholism and Degeneration in Dutch Medicine around 1900’’,
in Patrick Dassen and Maria Kemperink (eds), The Many Faces of Evolution in Europe,
c. 1860–1914 (Leuven, 2005), pp. 87–100. See also Frans van Poppel, Trouwen in Nederland.
Een historisch-demografische studie van de 19e en vroeg–20e eeuw (Wageningen, 1992), pp.
101–103, who discusses the ideas of H. Treub, S.R. Steinmetz, and C.J. Wijnaendts Francken.
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the Netherlands (1938–1968)’’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical
Sciences, 39 (2008), pp. 195–204, 200–201.
134. The exceptions included SDAP members A.E.J. de Vries-Bruins, F. Wibaut (son of the
famous alderman), the doctor and chairman of the Dutch Eugenics Federation G.P. Frets, the
criminologist Willem Bonger, F. Koster, the teacher and temperance advocate F.U. Schmidt and,
after the war, PvdA member Jannetje Zeelenberg; Noordman, Om de kwaliteit van het nage-
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preoccupation with the declining quality of the population, and especially of
the quality of recruits to the army. Further, not only was the urban prole-
tariat relatively small, but urbanization was on a smaller scale and developed
more gradually than in Scandinavia, Germany, Switzerland, and France for
example. The west of the Netherlands already constituted one of the most
urbanized regions of the world in the early modern period. Thirdly, as in
Britain, during the interwar years the social democrats were involved only
peripherally in and responsible for the construction of the welfare state,
again unlike what happened in Scandinavia, Switzerland, and Weimar
Germany. And, as we have seen especially in the Swedish case, in their ideas
about the role and costs of the welfare state socialists were easily tempted to
adopt eugenic ideas. Moreover, in the Netherlands the state took a relatively
cautious role in the design of a welfare state which was administered from
the top but left much to private initiative, both religious and secular. That
option was related closely to the denominational nature of organized social
life, characterized as it was by the emphasis on ‘‘sphere sovereignty’’, which
ensured a resilient and powerful civil society.
Given that after World War I the SDAP did acquire political respon-
sibility at the local level, it is interesting to analyse the social policy they
developed. In the four major cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht,
and The Hague, the socialists produced aldermen who were closely
involved in the construction of the welfare state and who advocated
greater intervention in social life. For the purpose of our argument, the
attempts to re-educate ‘‘antisocials’’ and ‘‘unsocials’’ in the interwar period
were important in that context, for which many SDAP aldermen and
officials tried to derive credit.135 During the interwar period, they laid the
groundwork for the so-called woonscholen (literally, housing schools),
small isolated complexes on the peripheries of cities (Amsterdam, Rot-
terdam, Utrecht, and The Hague), where slum dwellers were accom-
modated and taught by social workers how to lead a ‘‘decent’’ life.136
Although such projects were not very large in scale, and in principle the
people involved were free to leave the complexes, they show that, unlike
their Belgian counterparts,137 Dutch socialists too were not averse to
social engineering. Though hardly eugenic in nature, their policy was
designed to subdue ‘‘unproductive’’ and ‘‘antisocial’’ citizens, so allowing
collective interests to prevail over those of the individual. However,
135. Well-known examples being Arie Keppler, Director of Amsterdam’s Municipal Housing
Department, and the psychiatrist A. Querido.
136. Ali de Regt, Arbeidersgezinnen en beschavingsarbeid. Ontwikkelingen in Nederland
1870–1940 (Meppel [etc.], 1984); Adrianne Dercksen and Loes Verplanke, Geschiedenis van de
onmaatschappelijkheidsbestrijding in Nederland 1914–1970 (Meppel [etc.], 1987); Ben Maandag
and Tonny van der Mee, De asocialen. Heropvoeding in Drentse kampen (Rotterdam, 2005).
137. See Van den Eeckhout, ‘‘‘De onbewoonbare krotten’’’.
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unlike in Sweden and Switzerland it went no further than modest, ten-
tative steps along the path of high modernism.
Finally, another good example illustrating the fact that the majority of
Dutch – and British – social democrats lacked the same eugenicist impulse
for social engineering as seen in Sweden and Switzerland is their policy
towards ‘‘gypsies’’ and other traveller groups, who were prominent targets
of policy in both Sweden and Switzerland. Unlike in Germany, Swit-
zerland, Norway, and Sweden, those groups were left more or less alone
by British and Dutch central and local government. In Britain and the
Netherlands, the authorities did attempt to remove itinerant foreigners
across the border, while municipalities refused access to Dutch caravan-
dwelling families where possible.138 There were certainly no serious
endeavours to civilize them, let along sterilize them – certainly not before
World War II.139 That lack of interest was consistent with the general idea
of the national population being defined less in organic terms (‘‘social
body’’) than it was in Scandinavia and in German-speaking countries.
CONCLUSION
This article has compared the theories and social policies of social democrats
and other representatives of the left-wing political spectrum in six European
countries. Its chief focus has been the question of how we can explain why,
in certain countries such as Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland, weak social
groups were the target of illiberal and negative eugenic policy, especially
isolation and sterilization, while in other countries left-wing politicians and
theorists were far less radical (positive eugenicists, neo-Lamarckians).
To answer the central question posed here, I tested two hypotheses: the
first is derived from the work of Zygmunt Bauman, Michel Foucault, and
James Scott and emphasizes the desire of the state and the technocrats and
professionals associated with that state to crack down on those elements
of the population who found themselves unable to cope with social
change and unable to assimilate themselves into modern society, and
indeed to eliminate them, by, in the most extreme cases, sterilizing or
138. Annemarie Cottaar, Kooplui, kermisklanten en andere woonwagenbewoners. Groeps-
vorming en beleid, 1870–1945 (Amsterdam, 1996); idem et al., ‘‘Justice or Injustice? A Survey
of Government Policy towards Gypsies and Caravan Dwellers in Western Europe in the
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’’, Immigrants and Minorities, 11 (1992), pp. 42–66;
Leo Lucassen, ‘‘Between Hobbes and Locke: Gypsies and the Limits of the Modernization
Paradigm’’, Social History, 33 (2008), pp. 423–441.
139. Leo Lucassen, ‘‘Gypsy Research and Gypsy Policy in the Netherlands (1850–1970) in a
Comparative Perspective’’, in Michael Zimmermann (ed.), Zwischen Erziehung und Vernich-
tung. Zigeunerpolitik und Zigeunerforschung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart, 2007),
pp. 240–253; Willems, In Search of the True Gypsy; David Mayall, Gypsy Identities 1500–2000:
From Egipcyans and Moon-Men to the Ethnic Romany (London, 2004).
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killing them (Nazis). In that view, the political convictions of policy-
makers are subordinated to a shared ‘‘high modernist’’ ideology. The
vision of the future offered by the Myrdals, and to a somewhat lesser
extent by the Webbs, was wholly consistent with that. They were
enthusiastic advocates of a rational and technocratic ideology designed to
solve social problems, without taking much account of the expertise and
opinion of the population on whom that policy would be inflicted.
Although such a hypothesis is seductive, it would seem – ironically
enough – to be the victim of the phenomenon it purports to explain, since
the approach of Scott and others pays relatively little attention to
opposing forces, inconsequences, or unintended effects.140 Moreover, and
more importantly for our theme, it fails to explain why in countries such
as Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Germany, the ‘‘left’’ was much
less eager to follow the example of their counterparts elsewhere.
That brings us to the second hypothesis, the nature of left-wing ideology,
which manifested itself primarily in the concept of class antagonism and
which permeated the design of the welfare state. When we compare the six
countries considered in our study, one striking feature that emerges is the
difference between a communitarian-organic and a class-bound form of
socialism. The first variant can be found chiefly in Sweden, appropriately
captured by the term folkhem(met), which means something like a home
(hem) in which all people can feel at ease; it is also the term for ‘‘welfare
state’’. At the other extreme is the orientation towards class antagonism, with
Britain as its most pronounced representative.
Closely associated with the communitarian-organic variant of the welfare
state is the distinction between productive and unproductive citizens.141
Where the welfare state is regarded as a single large supportive and unified
community, those members who do not observe the rules or simply profit
from it soon become a liability, and not only in a financial sense, but morally
too. There, citizenship is conditional and intended only for those with
the right social attitude.142 By regarding society as a single organism, there
is a great temptation to view weak social groups in medical terms of
‘‘sickness’’ and ‘‘infection’’. Moreover, it legitimizes restricting the rights
140. On this criticism see also Charles Tilly, ‘‘Power – Top Down and Bottom Up’’, Journal of
Political Philosophy, 7 (1999), pp. 330–352, and Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question:
Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley, CA [etc.], 2005).
141. For the relationship between communitarianism and illiberal theories, including eugenics,
see too Sheri Berman, The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe’s
Twentieth Century (New York, 2006), p. 207.
142. The concept of ‘‘conditional’’ can also be seen in the postwar Eastern bloc, where one of
the state’s objectives was to create the new socialist man; often those were states that stressed
the importance of ethnic homogeneity, such as Czechoslovakia; Celia Donert, ‘‘‘The Struggle
for the Soul of the Gypsy’: Marginality and Mass Mobilization in Stalinist Czechoslovakia’’,
Social History, 33 (2008), pp. 123–144, 130.
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of the individual on the grounds that doing so serves the interests of the
community. Eugenics was perfectly consistent with such a view, since it
was both diagnosis and at the same time cure. The Webbs and the Myrdals
too were prominent representatives of that approach.
Such an organic-medical approach was less likely in a more class-
dependent variant of socialism. As long as social democrats and other leftist
politicians believed social problems such as inequality and poverty were
caused primarily by an unjust capitalist system, there was little cause for a
eugenicist solution. Instead, attention was directed towards a moderate
form of class struggle and on countering liberal and confessional opposi-
tion. Furthermore, class-dependent socialists accused eugenicists of a one-
sided and prejudiced approach, because they targeted only the socially
vulnerable, something many found sincerely objectionable as well as being
electorally unwise. The position of the Anglo-Saxon eugenicists Hogben,
Muller, and Haldane, most of whom were communists, illustrates this
political analysis. Eugenics was fine, but first the classless society had to be
realized.
That second hypothesis does not exclude the ‘‘high-modernist’’ approach
entirely though. As we have seen, technocratic forms of social engineering
played a major role in shaping illiberal policy. Moreover, the nature of civil
society, which Diko¨tter regarded as a potential buffer against ‘‘high mod-
ernism’’, was indeed an important factor. Despite what is generally assumed,
the resilience and influence of civil society can also vary markedly in
democracies which in theory operate well. In states ethnically, politically,
and religiously relatively homogenous, such as Sweden and Norway,
resistance to radical social policy was fairly limited;143 in countries more
sharply divided along political and religious lines, such as Britain and the
Netherlands (with its characteristic pillarization), no consensus could be
reached; in concluding this, we should regard the inhibiting influence of
Catholicism as a component of that civil society.
The distinction between the two sorts of socialism does not, though,
explain developments after World War II. Influenced by the ideas of
Beveridge and Keynes, the postwar period saw the emergence of a uni-
versal welfare state, which bore a close relationship to the communitarian-
organic vision of the social democrats. Contrary to what one might have
expected based on the analysis of the interwar period, that did not lead to
a more stringent and illiberal social policy. The explanation is fairly
simple. In the postwar welfare state social rights (such as benefits) became
largely disconnected from productive obligations.144
143. See also Rogers and Nelson, ‘‘‘Lapps, Finns, Gypsies, Jews, and Idiots’’’, p. 75.
144. T.H. Marshall, Social Policy in the Twentieth Century (London, 1979); Gøsta Esping-
Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge, 1990); Andreas Fahrmeir,
Citizenship: The Rise and Fall of a Modern Concept (New Haven, CT, 2007).
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Moreover, after 1945 the radicalization of the racial social policies of the
Nazis before and during World War II led to a huge mistrust of anything
that even remotely smacked of racism or invasion of privacy, even if that
did not apply to all groups, as Swiss policy towards the ‘‘Jenischen’’
demonstrated. The gradual turning point in Swedish sterilization practice
in the 1950s, which saw greater emphasis on voluntarism and the interests
of the individual, illustrates this paradigm shift. It was only with the
reform of the welfare state and cuts in welfare expenditure in the 1980s
and later,145 and the rise of populism and neo-nationalism, that the
illiberal aspects of the communitarian-organic model once again seemed
to gain greater acceptance throughout western Europe, a point illustrated
by policies towards ethnic minorities and the ‘‘underclass’’, which have
increasingly been problematized and categorized as alien and unproduc-
tive members of society.
It is a view by no means alien to many social democrats, as is evident
from the debate in the Netherlands in response to the Dutch Labour
Party resolution on integration in the early months of 2009.146 In that
resolution, drafted by high-ranking party officials and deeply influenced
by the communitarian vision of Paul Scheffer, a very influential party
member and public intellectual,147 integration was to a large extent por-
trayed as a cultural problem caused by Islam. And, consequently, the
solution would be for the Dutch-resident Moroccan and Turkish Muslim
populations to adopt Dutch norms and values.
At the same time, social and economic causes, such as unemployment
and the low level of human capital of the first generation, were largely
downplayed. As the Rotterdam sociologists Schinkel and Van den Berg
claim, because of its emphasis on consensus and on projecting Dutch
society as a coherent whole, the current debate on integration and citi-
zenship seems actually to promote antagonisms along ethnic lines
between those who have lived in the Netherlands for a long time and
those who have only recently arrived. In that sense, it is consistent with
the communitarian-organic tradition, whose roots have been exposed in
the present article.148
145. Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton,
NJ [etc.], 2006).
146. Socialisme en Democratie (January/February 2009) and Rood. Het ledenblad van de Partij
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